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LESSONS FROM CHINA’S CARBON MARKETS FOR U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
SUSAN VERMILLION*
INTRODUCTION
“I thought it was snowing. . . . Then I realized it wasn’t snow. I
have not seen the sun for a long time.” Wu Kai, a Chinese citizen in
Harbin, described the heavy smog that enveloped parts of northeast China
in October 2013.1 Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang province, closed all
primary and middle schools, as well as its airport.2 Heilongjiang province
shut down major highways because the smog reduced visibility to less
than fifty meters.3 Concentrations of fine particulate matter in the air
reached one thousand micrograms per cubic meter, and were classified
as hazardous to human health.4
At more than forty times the recommended limit,5 the Harbin
smog represents a deadly air pollution problem that is symptomatic of
China’s larger environmental crisis. Sixteen of the twenty most polluted
cities in the world are located in China.6 Citywide shutdowns due to
smog are becoming routine in the country, where its capital Beijing saw
PM2.5 concentrations of nine hundred micrograms per cubic meter in
January 2013.7 That smog shutdown was dubbed both “Airmageddon”
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2015; B.S. Conservation Biology, Brigham
Young University, 2012. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their
support during law school, and the entire staff of the Environmental Law and Policy
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1 Louise Watt, Super Smog Hits Chinese City as Air Pollution Soars to 40 Times Higher
than International Safety Standard, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:47 a.m.), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/21/super-smog-beijing-china_n_4134226.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/S9HE-EZ8C.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Keith Wagstaff, China’s Massive Pollution Problem, THE WEEK (Nov. 9, 2013), https://
puttingcanadafirst.ca/site//chinas-massive-pollution-problem, archived at http://perma
.cc/3G5B-BARU.
7 Tania Branigan, Beijing Smog Continues as Chinese State Media Urge More Action,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/14/beijing-smog
-continues-media-action, archived at http://perma.cc/QL9P-6ERF.
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and the “Airpocalypse,” and described as “the worst January smog since
1954.”8
Fine particulate matter originates primarily from combustion
sources.9 The October 2013 smog shutdown was caused because Harbin
turned on its heating system and people began burning more coal to stay
warm.10 Coal combustion emits fine particulate matter, as well as green-
house gases like carbon dioxide.11 The smog shutdowns plaguing China
indicate that greenhouse gas emissions are reaching dangerous new
levels, along with air pollutants. Air pollution is perhaps the most visible
symptom of China’s environmental crisis, but projected changes in global
temperatures due to climate change will have more permanent and global
reach than smog shutdowns.
Due in large part to the increasing frustration over deadly air
pollution,12 the Chinese government has recently put an unprecedented
focus on its environmental policy.13 Starting with its 11th Five Year Plan
in 2006, the Chinese government elevated its environmental targets to
the highest level of priority previously reserved for only the most impor-
tant state objectives, namely economic growth and stability.14 China’s
12th Five Year Plan, released in 2011, set even more ambitious environ-
mental goals, chief among them the implementation of a national carbon
trading scheme by 2015 to reduce carbon intensity (the amount of carbon
dioxide emissions per unit GDP) by 17% by 2015.15 Since then, the Chinese
8 Damian Grammaticas, ‘Airmageddon’: China Smog Raises Modernisation Doubts, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:43 a.m.), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-21272328,
archived at http://perma.cc/XD73-X8S5.
9 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, OZONE,
NITROGEN DIOXIDE AND SULFUR DIOXIDE 10 (2005).
10 Watt, supra note 1.
11 Air Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and
-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc
/9X2G-3NRC.
12 Edward Wong, Outrage Grows over Air Pollution and China’s Response, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/asia/beijing-journal-anger-grows
-over-air-pollution-in-china.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HU8U-AAUB.
13 Chris Buckley, Silver Lining in China’s Smog as it Puts Focus on Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/asia/silver-lining-in
-chinas-smog-as-it-puts-focus-on-emissions.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DUC5-HY3R.
14 Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and
Bureaucracy In China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 368 (2013).
15 GUOYI HAN ET AL., CHINA’S CARBON EMISSION TRADING: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
DEVELOPMENT (2012), available at http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager
/documents/Publications/china-cluster/SEI-FORES-2012-China-Carbon-Emissions.pdf;
Deborah Seligsohn & Angel Hsu, How Does China’s 12th Five-Year Plan Address Energy
and the Environment?, WORLD RES. INST., (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.wri.org/blog/how
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government has taken even more progressive steps, aiming to reduce
carbon intensity by 40–45% below 2005 levels by 2020.16 Officials have
even announced that they expect to launch a nationwide emissions trading
scheme as early as 2018.17
Although not compelled by apocalyptic smog shutdowns, the
United States has also set carbon reduction goals, pledging to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.18 The United
States government has elected to focus on using more renewable energy
and setting higher energy efficiency standards, rather than a national
carbon market.19 In order to reach this goal, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has proposed a Clean Power Plan that specifically targets
the energy sector.20 This plan seeks to cut carbon emission from power
plants by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.21 It does so by setting state-
specific emissions reduction goals for all states with fossil fuel powered
plants.22 While EPA sets the state’s reduction goal, each state is free to
choose the methods it will use to reduce the carbon intensity of its energy
sector, and even to collaborate with other states in multistate plans.23
This Note proposes that the most effective way to meet the United
States’ carbon emissions reduction goals for 2020 and beyond is to learn
from China’s new policy of linking environmental, public health, and
economic goals, specifically by implementing a national carbon market.
Part I of this Note explores carbon policies in China and the United
States. Part II analyzes the urgent need for China and the United States
-does-china%E2%80%99s-12th-five-year-plan-address-energy-and-environment, archived
at http://perma.cc/X88Z-2UTN.
16 Wang Shu, Recent Developments of Chinese ETC, P’SHIP FOR MKT. READINESS (Mar. 5,
2014), https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/China_Recent%20Development
%20of%20China%27s%20ETS%20%28PMR%20in%20Mexico%2920140305.pdf.
17 Id.
18 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 4 (2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimate
actionplan.pdf.
19 FACT SHEET: President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SEC’Y (June 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/fact
-sheet-president-obama-s-climate-action-plan, archived at http://perma.cc/SXR7-XLJY.
20 FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2
.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview (last updated
June 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EF39-MVH7.
21 FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Framework, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2
.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-framework (last updated
June 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZR44-P64G.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1–3.
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to take drastic action to cut their carbon emissions. Part III of this Note
argues that emissions trading schemes are the best solution to reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions.
Part IV of this Note provides general background on how carbon
markets work. Part V of this Note evaluates the progress of China’s carbon
markets. Part VI of this Note analyzes the lessons that the United States
can learn from China’s carbon market attempts.
I. CHINESE AND AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
The United States continues to be the world’s second largest pro-
ducer of carbon dioxide emissions, despite its recent reduction efforts.24
Recently, carbon dioxide emissions have fallen more rapidly than experts
have predicted.25 The United States emitted 1.4 billion tons of carbon
dioxide in 2012, the lowest amount since 1994.26 After peaking at over 1.6
billion tons in 2007, the United States has reduced its carbon dioxide
emissions every year since then, except for 2010.27
These drops, however, have been fueled in part by temporary or
unpredictable factors, such as unusually warm winters and economic
recession.28 For a more permanent and ambitious solution, the United
States’ best course of action is a mandatory, legally binding national
carbon market.
Although there is no current national carbon exchange frame-
work, multiple regions within the United States have taken the initiative
to form their own regional carbon markets. The Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) covers carbon emissions from power
plants in ten states in the United States Northeast.29 Launched in 2009,
the RGGI’s goal is to reduce emissions by 10% below 2009 levels by
24 Overview Data for United States: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=US&trk=m (last updated
May. 30, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/FL4C-YMHL.
25 See Wendy Koch, U.S. Carbon Emissions Hit Lowest Level Since 1994, USA TODAY
(Oct. 21, 2013, 6:04 p.m.), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/us
-carbon-emissions-energy-lowest-1994/3146123/, archived at http://perma.cc/D3EJ-F6FW.
26 Id.; Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions Declined in 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10691, archived
at http://perma.cc/9DYU-WJFZ; Emily E. Adams, U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Down
11 Percent Since 2007, EARTH POLICY INST. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.earth-policy
.org/data_highlights/2013/highlights41, archived at http://perma.cc/G24Z-QUD7.
27 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 26; Adams, supra note 26.
28 Koch, supra note 25; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 26; Adams, supra note 26.
29 HAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 10.
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2018.30 The RGGI is associated with five offset programs, which include
capturing methane from landfills and livestock manure.31
Two recent regional carbon markets in the United States both
center on California. The California Climate Change Law Exchange
launched on January 1, 2013 with a goal of cutting emissions to 1990
levels by 2020.32 The California Exchange covers 85% of the state’s carbon
emitters, making it one of the largest carbon markets in the world, second
only to the European Union’s.33 The market’s first five quarterly auctions
were widely considered successful, resulting in plans to double the cap
in 2015 to include transportation fuels and natural gas distributers.34
California formally linked its cap-and-trade program with Quebec’s
similar program on January 1, 2014.35
The only nationwide carbon exchange in United States history
was the voluntary Chicago Carbon Exchange (“CCX”), which lasted from
2003 to 2010.36 At its height, the CCX included 450 power companies,
manufacturers, cities, and universities.37 Its commitments were legally
binding upon members and, despite its voluntary status, it attracted a
number of influential parties, such as Ford, Motorola, DuPont, and Interna-
tional Paper.38 After eight years, CCX’s market collapsed due to an inflated
number of credits from offset programs, cutting the permit prices to a
nickel per unit.39
The CCX experiment was not a total loss, however, as it resulted
in a reduction of 700 million metric tons of carbon dioxide since 2003.40
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 KATHERINE HSRA-KIUNG ET AL., CARBON MARKET CALIFORNIA: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE GOLDEN STATE’S CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, ENVTL. DEF. FUND vi (2014),
available at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/executive_summary_v2.pdf.
33 Id.
34 Id. at vi–vii.
35 Id. at viii.
36 Marianne Lavelle, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade Experiment to End, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/news/energy/2010/11/101103
-chicago-climate-exchange-cap-and-trade-election/, archived at http://perma.cc/5WZQ
-UASJ.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Nathanial Gronewold, Chicago Climate Exchange Closes Nation’s First Cap-and-Trade
System but Keeps Eye to the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com
/cwire/2011/01/03/03climatewire-chicago-climate-exchange-closes-but-keeps-ey-78598
.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/RM96-V9TG.
40 Lavelle, supra note 36.
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Eighty-eight percent of those cuts came from industrial emission reduc-
tions, while 12% came from offset programs such as tree planting.41
CCX’s existence also indicates that companies and industries are
not as opposed to carbon exchanges as the current divisive political climate
might suggest.42 As one representative for a former party to the CCX said,
“Many of us were doing this not only to make voluntary commitments,
but as a way that we could get prepared for a mandatory future. . . . We
were learning the ropes, learning about trading and trying to become
more proficient in reducing our carbon footprint over time.”43 This sug-
gests that not only can companies and industries learn to adapt to
mandatory carbon markets, but that a number are eager to do so.
CCX’s demise may have been tied to the failure of another na-
tional cap-and-trade effort in 2009. The American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 (“ACESA”) is the origin of the 17% reduction by
2020 goal for carbon dioxide emissions.44 The bill would have imple-
mented a mandatory, national carbon market by 2016, with emissions
cuts starting in 2012.45 The bill extended emissions goals to 42% below
2005 levels by 2030, and to more than 80% below 2005 levels by 2050.46
The ACESA market would have started with 85% of the permits being
“grandfathered in” or distributed for free.47 Most of those free permits
would have gone to local electricity distribution companies, as well as
energy-intensive industries like iron, steel, cement, and paper.48
The carbon market would have allowed up to two billion tons of
total emissions reductions to be achieved using offsets.49 Approximately
half of these offset programs would have taken place in the United States,
and half would have been international.50 The bill also included stricter
energy efficiency standards, investments in energy technology, and a
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Kate Sheppard, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Waxman-Markey
Energy/Climate Bill—In Bullet Points, GRIST (June 4, 2009, 6:43 a.m.), http://grist.org
/article/2009-06-03-waxman-markey-bill-breakdown/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZUA4
-BXR9.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Sheppard, supra note 44.
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Renewable Electricity Standard requiring utility companies to increase
their use of renewable energy.51
According to a 2009 EPA study, the bill would have delayed energy
consumption levels that the United States is currently scheduled to reach
in 2015 until 2040.52 The bill would have also increased the market share
of low carbon energy (including renewables and nuclear) to 18% by 2020,
26% by 2030, and 30% by 2050.53 Without the bill, the market share is
projected to remain steady at 14%.54
ACESA passed in the Democrat-controlled House of Representa-
tives by a narrow margin of 219–212.55 The vote largely proceeded along
party lines, with 43 Democrats voting against it, and only 8 Republicans
voting for it.56 The Senate never brought the bill to a vote, effectively
killing the legislation.57 A similar bill is unlikely to pass the current
Republican-controlled House of Representatives, though many of the
energy efficiency standards and investments in renewable energy tech-
nology have been resurrected in President Obama’s 2013 Climate Action
Plan, and later in EPA’s Clean Power Plan.58
The Clean Power Plan sets rate-based goals for each state to reduce
the carbon intensity of its fuel-powered power plants.59 While EPA sets
states’ goals, it allows each state the flexibility to implement whichever
methods it chooses to meet the goal.60 EPA does, however, provide four
“building blocks” for the state to choose from in order to construct its reduc-
tion strategy.61 These building blocks include: (1) improving the efficiency
of fossil fuel plants; (2) using low-emitting power sources more frequently;
51 Id.
52 OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009: H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH CONGRESS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY 3 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/EPAactivities
/HR2454_Analysis.pdf.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 H.R. 2454 (111th): American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/h477 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/3LQ4-P94H.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FACT SHEET: President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, supra note 19.
59 FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Framework, supra note 21, at 1.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id.
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(3) using more low-emitting power sources; and (4) making more efficient
use of electricity.62
However, these state-specific standards alone may not result in
the 17% reduction in United States emissions by 2020 needed to slow the
rise of global temperatures.63 China has reacted to its environmental and
public health crisis with ambitious goals that utilize the power of carbon
markets, an option that EPA needs to consider.
II. CHINA MAKES ITS MOVE TO ADDRESS A GLOBAL CRISIS
In 1990, China was responsible for 10% of the world’s greenhouse
gas emissions.64 By 2013, it was responsible for 30%.65 China has been
the largest producer of carbon dioxide emissions since 2006, and its
emissions more than doubled between 2000 and 2011.66 This is largely
due to China’s heavy reliance on coal, which comprises 70% of its total
energy consumption.67 China is the world’s largest coal consumer, burn-
ing through nearly as much coal as every other country in the world
combined.68
This heavy coal consumption has serious implications beyond
hazardous air pollution because coal combustion releases 30% more
carbon dioxide than petroleum and 78% more carbon dioxide than natural
62 Id. at 2–3.
63 NICHOLAS M. BIANCO ET AL., CAN THE US GET THERE FROM HERE?: SUMMARY FOR
POLICY MAKERS 1 (2013), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/can_us
_get_there_from_here_summary.pdf.
64 The East is Grey, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com
/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-energy-its
-rise-will-have, archived at http://perma.cc/C39X-KWCB.
65 Id.
66 International Energy Statistics: China, United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=CH
,US,&syid=2000&eyid=2011&unit=MMTCD (last visited Jan. 15, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/V227-894S; China Leads World to a Higher Carbon Pollution, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2009
/11/17/china-leads-world-to-higher-carbon-pollution, archived at http://perma.cc/39GK
-EMSK.
67 Christina Nunez, Harbin Smog Crisis Highlights China’s Coal Problem, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 22, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/10
/131022-harbin-ice-city-smog-crisis-china-coal/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZN2Y-A8AT.
68 China Consumes Nearly as Much Coal as the Rest of the World Combined, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9751,
archived at http://perma.cc/6NNE-9HFZ.
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gas.69 While China’s air pollution certainly takes a toll on its population’s
health,70 the impacts of climate change are projected to have even greater
long-term costs to global human health. In 2012, the international
humanitarian organization DARA released its second Climate Vulner-
ability Monitor, which found that climate change currently contributes
to 400,000 deaths worldwide, primarily from hunger and communicable
diseases.71 The report estimates that if countries continue to emit green-
house gases at their current rate, climate change could cause up to
700,000 deaths per year by 2030.72
In an attempt to reduce the short-term health impacts of coal
combustion, China has banned new coal plants in three industrial re-
gions because of air quality problems.73 This is certainly a step in the
right direction, but some of the other efforts China has made to fight air
pollution will actually worsen the long-term impacts of climate change.
In 2013, China approved several large-scale projects to turn coal into
synthetic natural gas.74 While this will improve air quality, synthetic
natural gas actually creates seven times more greenhouse gas emissions
than natural gas, negating the environmental benefits of these projects.75
The synthetic natural gas project exemplifies the way China’s
local, short-term actions affect long-term, global climate change. Since
2000, China has been responsible for two-thirds of the world’s increase
in carbon dioxide emissions.76 According to current projections, China’s
emissions between 1990 and 2050 will equal 500 billion tons, the same
amount that the entire world emitted between the industrial revolution
and 1970.77
69 Bill Chameides, Climate Change: China Puts Kibosh on New Coal Plants, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC (Sept. 13, 2013), http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2013/09/13/climate
-change-china-puts-kibosh-on-new-coal-plants/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z936-GFXN.
70 See Wagstaff, supra note 6. Studies indicate that air pollution contributed to 1.2 million
premature Chinese deaths in 2010 alone, lung cancer rates in China have spiked 465%
over the last thirty years, and 500 million people’s lives have been shortened by an
average of 5.5 years. Id.
71 DARA, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR: A GUIDE TO THE COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT
PLANET 17 (2012), available at http://www.daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09
/EXECUTIVE-AND-TECHNICAL-SUMMARY.pdf.
72 Id.
73 Nunez, supra note 67.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 The East is Grey, supra note 64.
77 Id.
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As previously noted, China has changed its environmental policies
in the last five years. First, the government established a Ministry for
Environmental Protection in 2008.78 In 2012, the National Congress of
the Communist Party of China (“CPC”) added the principle of “Ecological
Civilization” to its constitution.79 For the first time since 1989, the
government proposed amendments to its Environmental Protection Law,
the main framework for China’s legal environmental approach.80 These
legal changes signify the government’s changing attitudes toward the
environment and environmental health.
However, the real evidence that Chinese leaders are starting to
take climate change seriously lies in changes to the country’s cadre
evaluation system.81 The cadre system is China’s structure for bureau-
cratic personnel evaluation, essentially deciding which local party mem-
bers and leaders receive promotions.82 Lower-level bureaucrats that meet
the state’s targets are rewarded with financial bonuses, prizes, and
promotions, while those that fail to meet their goals are penalized with
transfers, financial punishments, or worse.83 The state’s overall goals are
established through successive five-year plans, which set economic and
social development targets.84 Targets are given differing levels of impor-
tance, which signal to mayors and other local leaders which goals must
be met at all costs, and which are given only nominal significance.85
These goals can be labeled as soft targets, hard targets, or “tar-
gets with veto power” (veto targets).86 Soft targets have the lowest prior-
ity, and previously included environmental goals.87 Hard targets are
mandatory, and traditionally include economic development goals.88 Veto
targets have the highest priority, with automatic penalties attached to
any failures.89 Veto targets historically included social stability and the
78 Id.
79 Guizhen He et al., Revising China’s Environmental Law, 341 SCIENCE 133 (2013).
80 Michael Standaert, China’s Proposed Revisions to Environmental Protection Law Draw
Mixed Reviews, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 31, 2013), http://www.bna.com/chinas-proposed
-revisions-n17179875568/, archived at http://perma.cc/4PFE-C5HB.
81 See Wang, supra note 14, at 368.
82 Id. at 378.
83 Id. at 379–80.
84 Id. at 379.
85 Id. at 380.
86 Id.
87 Wang, supra note 14, at 380–81.
88 Id. at 380.
89 Id.
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one-child policy.90 The hypercompetitive nature of the cadre system, in
which success is always judged relative to others’ performance,91 often
means that soft targets are sacrificed in order to meet veto targets.92
Thus, in line with past five-year plans, local leaders chose to ignore
environmental goals in order to meet the more important economic
development and industrialization targets.93
This is why 2006’s 11th Five-Year Plan represented such a stark
change for China’s climate change policies and broader environmental
attitude. Environmental targets—specifically goals for climate change
mitigation, energy efficiency, and pollution—were raised to hard target
and even veto status.94 Environmental targets were considered “binding”
key indicators for the first time.95 To give some perspective, the 11th
Five-Year Plan contained twenty-two key indicators, eight of which were
designated binding.96 Four of these eight binding key indicators were
environmentally focused.97 One of the most ambitious key indicators was
the goal to reduce energy intensity (energy consumption per $1 GDP) by
20%, which China narrowly missed, instead achieving a 19.1% reduction.98
The 12th Five-Year Plan includes even more aggressive climate
change and environmental targets. It sets goals to increase non-fossil
fuels to 11.4% of primary energy consumption, increase forest cover by
12.5 million hectares, further reduce energy intensity by 16%, and reduce
carbon intensity by 17%, all by 2015.99 These goals are part of the larger
framework wherein China is working to reduce carbon intensity by
40–45% below 2005 levels by 2020, as part of its COP-15 commitments.100
In recognition that these ambitious goals require more fundamental policy
changes than rolling blackouts will achieve, China has implemented seven
90 Id.
91 Id. at 379–80.
92 Id. at 380–81.
93 The East is Grey, supra note 64; Wang, supra note 14, at 381.
94 Wang, supra note 14, at 381.
95 Id. at 399.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 414. The success and sustainability of the energy intensity reduction is debatable,
as local governments had to resort to week-long blackouts of cities and industries to meet
the goal. Jim Bai & Tom Miles, China County Institutes Blackouts to Save Energy—Media,
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2010, 1:42 a.m.), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/06/china
-power-idAFTOE68502L20100906, archived at http://perma.cc/5UZL-8T62.
99 Seligsohn & Hsu, supra note 15.
100 HAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 13–14.
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experimental local carbon markets to theoretically pave the way for a
national carbon market by 2018. As will be discussed below, the carbon
market is an effective step in lowering carbon intensity and overall carbon
emissions, which should be studied and followed by the United States.
A. Why Climate Change Requires Serious Action
In the long term, unregulated greenhouse gases like carbon
dioxide will result in a far more disastrous outcome than smog.101 One of
the lessons that the U.S. can learn from China’s new environmental
policy is recognizing the link between environmental health and public
health. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) reports that “[c]limate
change affects social and environmental determinants of health—clean
air, safe drinking water, sufficient food and secure shelter.”102
1. Public Health Crisis
WHO estimates that climate change had already cost over 140,000
excess deaths per year by 2004.103 WHO also estimates that climate
change’s direct damage cost to health will exceed two billion dollars by
2030.104 Rising temperatures contribute to deaths from cardiovascular
and respiratory disease in the elderly, and increase the levels of ozone
and other pollutants in the air.105 Air pollution already contributes to 1.2
billion deaths every year, and the number is expected to increase as
temperatures rise.106
The number of weather-related natural disasters reported each
year has tripled since the 1960s.107 These natural disasters cause over
101 See Kevin Bullis, Averting Disastrous Climate Change Could Depend on Unproven
Technologies, MIT TECH. REVIEW (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news
/526411/averting-disastrous-climate-change-could-depend-on-unproven-technologies/,
archived at http://perma.cc/4JYR-EKTK.
102 Climate Change and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre
/factsheets/fs266/en/ (last modified Nov. 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GG73-4ZRC.
103 Climate Change is a Health Issue, CLIMATE HEALTH ALLIANCE, http://caha.org.au/wp
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60,000 deaths each year, primarily in developing nations.108 WHO esti-
mates that by the end of the century, droughts will occur twice as often
and last six times longer.109 Higher temperatures and lower rainfall are
likely to result in decreased food production of up to 50% in some regions
of Africa.110 This will exacerbate malnutrition and under-nutrition, which
already claim more than 3.1 million lives each year.111
Climate change is also expected to change the way diseases are
spread and transmitted. Vector-borne diseases are anticipated to experi-
ence an increased transmission season, as well as an increased geo-
graphic range.112 Malaria already kills almost 800,000 people every year,
and this is expected to increase as temperatures rise and mosquitos are
active for longer periods of time throughout the year.113 Dengue fever is
also spread by mosquitos in tropical countries, and WHO estimates that
climate change could expose more than 2 billion people to dengue fever
by 2080.114 In the United States, West Nile Virus rates have sharply
increased over the last few decades.115 A study published in the American
Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene reported that hospitalizations
from West Nile have cost the United States approximately $780 million
since 1999.116
WHO summarizes that “[a]ll populations will be affected by
climate change, but some are more vulnerable than others.”117 These
more vulnerable groups include children, the elderly, and those with pre-
existing medical conditions such as asthma.118
2. Unprecedented Environmental Degradation & Global Conflict
In addition to numerous detriments to public health, climate
change is expected to have devastating environmental and social costs.
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The frequency of severe floods across Europe is expected to double before
2050, with accompanying costs increasing five-fold.119 The United States
government estimates that climate change impacts—including more
extreme droughts and floods, crop losses, and sea level rise—are costing
Americans $37 per ton of carbon dioxide emitted.120 This represents an
increase from the last figure in 2010, when the government estimated
that the impacts of climate change cost Americans $21 dollars per ton of
carbon dioxide emitted.121 However, this estimated cost is likely wildly
insufficient because it does not factor in all the myriad effects of climate
change. Experts warned that this figure did not take into account in-
creased damage from forest fires or damage to crops from the increased
risk of pest problems.122
Unregulated greenhouse gas emissions could lead to warming of
4 °C or higher by the end of the century.123 The last time the planet was
that warm, global sea levels were five meters higher than current levels.124
Sea level rise of this magnitude would lead to mass migrations away from
coastlines and low-lying islands.125
Experts have recently begun exploring the unpredictable social
costs of climate change. Because violent crime rates increase during
higher temperatures, researchers now theorize that climate change could
lead to increased criminal activity.126 A study published in the Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management predicts that by the end
of the century, higher temperatures due to climate change will cause an
additional 22,000 murders, 180,000 rapes, and 2.4 million assaults.127
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The social costs of these higher crime rates could reach as high as $115
billion.128 The author of the study said that “[t]he broader context here
is that climate change will influence our lives in a variety of ways beyond
how much water we can spare for such things as farming.”129
III. CARBON MARKETS: THE BEST “BUILDING BLOCK” FOR STATES
A. Background on Carbon Markets
Carbon “cap-and-trade” markets work by setting an overall
emissions cap limiting the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions that
can be produced by the body in question, usually a country, or region, or
trade union.130 Operating under that cap, allowances or permits are
distributed to the parties involved, including companies, industries, and
other stakeholders.131 Each individual party is allowed to produce emis-
sions based on the number of permits or allowances it holds.132 Pollution
permits are typically sold at auction, though sometimes they are
“grandfathered” or distributed to parties at no cost.133
Parties who emit less than their current permits allow are able to
sell their remaining permits to other parties to make a profit.134 Parties
who wish to emit more than their current permits allow are able to pur-
chase permits from other parties, or if none are available, purchase
reductions from an offset program.135 When emissions are high, permits
become scarcer and more expensive, which in theory will incentivize
parties to pursue a more cost-effective method of emissions reduction
rather than purchasing more permits or offsets.136 Some carbon markets,
such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”),
allow non-emitting parties to purchase permits, thus reducing the num-
ber of permits in circulation and increasing the price, further incentivizing
other parties to reduce emissions.137
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A successful carbon trading market requires five administrative and
monitoring conditions to function properly in limiting emissions: (1) set-
ting the total emissions limit or cap; (2) a fair method of allocating the
quota of permits or allowances among the parties; (3) credible verification
and accounting rules to monitor the emissions; (4) a free trading infra-
structure, such as exchanges or registries; and (5) a strict accountability
system in case of noncompliance.138
These conditions are vulnerable, especially in corruption-prone
countries such as China.139 Misuse of the system will render the trading
scheme ineffective.140 The success of a carbon market is measured by
several metrics. Effectiveness is measured by the resultant emissions
reduction,141 while the cost-effectiveness or efficiency is measured by the
emission reduction cost.142 Other metrics include innovation and investment
in clean technology, and whether carbon leakage has occurred (whether
one country increases emissions due to the decrease in the country with
the trading market).143
B. Successful Carbon Markets
The Kyoto Protocol established an international carbon trading
market among thirty-seven countries in 2005, with the goal of reducing
emissions by 5% below 1990 levels by 2012.144 The Kyoto Protocol is linked
with the Clean Development Mechanism, an offset program wherein
investors from developed countries obtain carbon credits by implementing
projects in developing countries that will reduce global emissions overall.145
The EU ETS established a trading scheme among the twenty-
seven members of the European Union in 2005, with the goal of reducing
emissions by 21% below 2005 levels by 2020.146 Since 2005, regional and
national carbon markets have spread rapidly.147 In 2011, the global car-
bon market was worth $142 billion.148
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Although various countries and regions have found relative success
in reducing carbon emissions through carbon exchanges, China and the
United States have been conspicuously absent from the Kyoto Protocol
and any sort of mandatory, legally binding national carbon market.149
Their absence is especially counter-productive because they are by far
the world’s two largest emitters of carbon dioxide.150 In 2008, China
surpassed the United States as the largest producer of carbon dioxide
emissions in the world.151 Together, these two countries were responsible
for 42% of the total global carbon dioxide emissions in 2008.152
After establishing that the United States and China are undoubt-
edly the two most powerful economic and political forces in mitigating
climate change, this Note will next examine the reasons that these two
countries have yet to enact any meaningful emissions reduction mecha-
nisms.
C. China’s Emerging Carbon Markets
The concept of carbon permit trading in China first began under
the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.153 The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) first endorsed the CDM
in 2004, with formal trading implemented in 2005.154 While the CDM has
been successful in reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by about one
billion tons since its inception, this success is tempered somewhat by the
fact that this amount is roughly equivalent to China’s increase in emis-
sions from 2009 to 2010.155
In 2008, the NDRC established several environment and carbon
exchanges—the Tianjin Climate Exchange, the China Beijing Environ-
ment Exchange, and the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchanges.156
However, to date these exchanges have focused exclusively on facilitating
149 See id. at 10; The World’s Carbon Markets, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N., http://
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CDM transactions and Voluntary Emissions Reductions (“VER”).157 Al-
though there have been some efforts at standardizing measurements,
benchmarks, etc., there has been no actual voluntary trading.158
The 12th Five-Year Plan specifically included carbon markets as
a key measure to reduce carbon intensity.159 In 2011, the NDRC officially
approved carbon trading pilots in seven cities and provinces.160 The seven
pilot carbon-trading schemes began in the summer of 2013, with two
more approved for launch in November 2013.161
By late 2013, China had officially launched five carbon dioxide mar-
kets: Tianjin, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong.162 Although
few of these exchanges have released information about the size of their
market caps,163 some have already expressed concern about the over-
allocation of permits.164 This over-allocation is caused by the markets’
reliance on self-reported emissions data from companies and industries,
which creates an incentive for companies to over-report past emissions
levels in order to claim more permits.165 While the official launch of five
carbon markets before 2014 is encouraging, if the market caps are set too
high, permit-holders have no incentive to restrict their emissions and
depart from their “business-as-usual” behavior.166 Over-allocation will
result in artificially low permit prices, which provides no motivation for
industries to innovate or invest in more low-carbon technologies.167
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One carbon market that has provided information regarding its
total carbon dioxide cap is the Shenzhen carbon exchange.168 The Shenzhen
exchange aims to reduce its carbon intensity by 21% below 2010 levels,
using a cap of 32 million tons of carbon dioxide.169 It applies to all compa-
nies that emit more than 20,000 tons of carbon dioxide over twenty-six
industries, including electricity, natural gas, water supply, and indus-
trial manufacturing.170 While the total market cap is appropriately set,
the Shenzhen pilot market is disappointing in that it only covers approxi-
mately 40% of total emissions, which leaves the region vulnerable to
carbon leakage and no actual reduction of emissions.171
Although all seven carbon exchange pilots were implemented by
mid-2014, China remains in danger of missing its carbon-intensity
reduction goals.172 The country’s progress has been superficially impres-
sive, cutting its carbon intensity for nine consecutive years leading up to
2014.173 In 2013, it reduced its economy’s carbon intensity by 3.5%, which
was its largest reduction since the financial crisis of 2008.174 However, to
meet the 40–45% reduction goal by 2020 would require at least a 3.9%
reduction every year for the rest of the decade.175
Although China has not released national data reporting its
carbon emissions since 2005, British Petroleum’s annual energy statis-
tics are considered a fairly accurate substitute.176 Based on these figures,
the country has no hope of meeting its 17% reduction goal by 2015.177
While China likely will not meet all of its ambitious goals, there are still
numerous lessons to be learned from its embrace of carbon markets.
D. Lessons From China’s Carbon Markets
China’s carbon markets can teach the United States which pitfalls
to avoid in successfully implementing a national carbon market.
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The first lesson is in avoiding carbon leakage. Unlike the Shenzhen
carbon market, emissions trading schemes have to be “geographically and
industrially comprehensive” in order to effectively reduce net emissions.178
If the trading scheme does not target all regions or industries, it runs the
risk of shifting demand to sectors not covered by the cap, and the ineffec-
tive market does not result in a net emissions reduction.179 The problem of
domestic carbon leakage increases with the number and size of industries
that are not included in the carbon market.180
The second lesson that the United States can learn from China’s
carbon markets is that caps should be set low enough to actually incentivize
lower emissions, rather than encouraging reductions in name only. In fact,
one of the regional American carbon markets can also provide lessons
about setting emissions caps. The paradox inherent in emissions trading
schemes is that as the market drives innovation and lower-carbon technol-
ogy, the demand for emissions permits drops. According to some analysts,
this means that drops in permit prices are actually a signal of success,
and not debilitating instability.181 These analysts argue that the price of
carbon permits most accurately reflects the cost of reducing emissions.182
Therefore, unexpectedly low permit prices mean that industries have found
it easier than anticipated to reduce their emissions.183
Some markets have been able to adapt to decreased demand and
lower prices with flexible emissions caps.184 The Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) responded to permit price fluctuations by pro-
gressively lowering the total market cap.185 Members of the RGGI agreed
to cut the program’s cap by 45% starting in 2014, and by another 2.5%
every year after that until 2020.186 The RGGI responded with rebounding
permit prices.187 This illustrates the necessity of setting appropriately
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low emissions caps, and in lowering them in response to changing tech-
nology and market conditions.
The third lesson is the importance of linking economic and envi-
ronmental achievement, as the Chinese government has successfully
accomplished with their 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans. China set its
ambitious environmental goals partially in response to economic stagna-
tion.188 This environmental focus is part of an effort to transform China’s
economic growth model from high-polluting local industries into more
efficient “corporate powerhouses capable of competing on the global
stage,”189 all while opening new opportunities for investing in environ-
mental and energy industries.190 If the United States is serious about
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it needs to emphasize the accompa-
nying economic growth opportunities possible.
The RGGI has already raised $1.4 billion, and is projected to raise
another $0.6 billion by 2020.191 The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”), an international economic orga-
nization, calculated that if countries were to use explicit carbon pricing
mechanisms such as carbon markets to meet their respective reduction
targets, they would raise up to $250 billion per year by 2020.192 Carbon
markets have the potential to raise valuable revenue for the United States
and other countries, while reducing emissions and encouraging invest-
ment in lower-carbon technology.
Another lesson to be learned from China’s carbon market experi-
ment is the necessity of transparency in emissions data. As previously
discussed, the over-reporting of emissions data in the Tianjin carbon
market has possibly resulted in over-allocation, which negates the
effectiveness of any emissions trading scheme.193 In order to avoid similar
problems, an efficient carbon market needs to verify actual emissions
data when calculating appropriate total caps.
E. Why Carbon Markets?
While the mixed success of China’s carbon markets illustrates the
potential pitfalls of emissions trading, it is still the most efficient option
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to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions. A 2013 policy paper from the
OECD found that explicit carbon pricing mechanisms are more cost-
effective than implicit carbon pricing mechanisms.194 OECD reported
that carbon markets are approximately 94% cheaper than subsidies paid
for renewable energy, and just as effective at reducing emissions.195
Explicit carbon pricing refers to carbon taxes and emissions trad-
ing systems, which put a price on each ton of carbon dioxide emitted.196
Implicit carbon pricing refers to policy methods such as standards, regu-
lations, and product taxes based on fuel content or volume rather than
carbon dioxide emissions.197 These methods put an implicit price on
carbon, which places the cost of reducing emissions on consumers and
producers.198
Explicit carbon pricing works by incentivizing investment in low-
carbon technology and increased energy efficiency.199 The OECD study
found that carbon markets and carbon taxes were more cost-effective at
reaching the global community’s ultimate goal of low-carbon economies.200
In order to reach the 2 °C goal agreed to by the global community,
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere must be stabi-
lized at 450 parts per million (“ppm”).201 All of the possible paths to sta-
bilize global emissions would require zero net greenhouse gas emissions
during the second half of the twenty-first century.202
The likeliest scenario for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions
will be the one that has the lowest cost to society.203 In its study, the
OECD calculated that annual emissions would need to be limited to
forty-five gigatons of carbon dioxide by 2020, and twenty-four gigatons
by 2050.204 If emissions continue at the current “business as usual” rate,
annual emissions are projected to reach fifty-one gigatons by 2020 and
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eighty-two gigatons by 2050.205 Delaying comprehensive global action
until 2020 will make any eventual action much more expensive. If an-
nual emissions reach more than forty-five gigatons by 2020, they will
need to be sharply reduced to nineteen gigatons by 2050 in order to meet
the goal of 450 ppm.206
Of the explicit carbon pricing choices, emissions exchanges are the
best way to guarantee the resulting level of maximum emissions, as
opposed to carbon taxes which discourage emissions but do not set any
concrete limits.207 In addition, OECD found that carbon markets were the
most cost-efficient method of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, with a
carbon price of approximately 10 EUR per ton of carbon dioxide.208 By
comparison, the cost of other implicit and explicit carbon pricing mecha-
nisms cost an average of 170 EUR per ton of carbon dioxide.209 Carbon
markets can also inadvertently reduce other greenhouse gases because
carbon dioxide emissions are largely linked to the same economic activi-
ties responsible for many other greenhouse gases.210
F. Lessons from Acid Rain
More than mere projection, cap-and-trade programs have had
actual success in solving other environmental problems in the United
States. In 1990, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to include Title IV,
the Acid Rain Program.211 The Acid Rain Program was the first large
scale cap-and-trade system intended to reduce environmental pollution
in the world.212 The goal of this program was to reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions by ten million tons below 1980 levels.213
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Acid rain is the result of sulfur dioxide emissions, primarily from
coal-fueled power plants.214 In order to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions
and save the Northeast’s lakes and rivers, the United States departed
from previous “command-and-control” environmental regulation models.215
The prior environmental legislation focused on uniform emission limits or
uniform pollution-control technology.216 By implementing a more flexible
control scheme focused on net emissions reductions, the cap-and-trade
market made it possible for plants with higher reduction costs to trade
with plants that face lower reduction costs.217
This flexibility was key to the Acid Rain Program’s cost efficiency
and overall environmental benefit. From 1990 to 2004, national sulfur
dioxide emissions decreased 36%, from 15.9 million tons to 10.2 million
tons.218 This was achieved despite a national increase in electricity gen-
eration from coal power plants of 25% during that time.219 The program’s
overall goal of reduction to 8.95 million tons was accomplished by 2007.220
By 2010, national sulfur dioxide emissions reached an even lower target
of 5.1 million tons.221
The Acid Rain Program also reached its goals faster than expected
because many utility companies over-complied during the first phase.222
Internal incentives, such as low-cost abatement technologies that could
easily be applied to older power plants, caused emissions to fall much
lower than the program’s Phase I target.223
In addition to its cost efficiency and environmental benefits, the
Acid Rain Program also achieved unexpected public health advantages.224
Reduced levels of airborne fine particles produced by sulfur dioxide emis-
sions resulted in public health benefits of $50 billion per year by 2010.225
Twenty years after the program’s implementation, analysts with
the Harvard Environmental Economics Program estimated that the cap-
and-trade model for sulfur dioxide cost 15–90% less than a program that
would have required uniform control technology, or uniform emissions
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reductions from every power plant.226 In 1990, EPA estimated that the Acid
Rain Program’s cap-and-trade market would cost upwards of $6.1 billion.227
In 1998, an industry-funded research company estimated the program’s
implementation would cost $1.7 billion.228 That same year, an independent
research company estimated the cost was even lower, at $1.1 billion.229
The Harvard researchers ended their twenty-year reflective analysis
by noting that:
Ironically, the cap-and-trade model seems especially well
suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in
that emitted [greenhouse gases] are evenly distributed
throughout the world’s atmosphere. Emissions reductions
anywhere make identical contributions to helping allevi-
ate the problem, and there are no pollutant concentration
hot-spots. The sheer number and variety of [greenhouse
gases] emissions sources . . . magnifies the cost savings
that could be achieved by enlisting the market to find the
least costly abatement options.230
CONCLUSION
China has reached a critical point in the history of its attitude to-
ward the environment. As an effort to maintain its legitimacy, the Chinese
government has recognized that it needs to cure its air pollution problem
in order to keep its citizens happy and healthy. Though air pollution is the
most immediate symptom of heavy industrialization, it is not the only, nor
the most important, consequence of a carbon-intensive economy.
As previously discussed, climate change is forecasted to have disas-
trous effects on public health, society, and the environment. After decades
of denial, a majority of Americans have come to realize that the govern-
ment needs to take action to reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions.
A survey by the Yale Project on Climate Change and Communica-
tion and the George Mason Center for Climate Change found that 83%
of Americans “say the U.S. should make an effort to reduce global warming,
even if it has economic costs.”231 Sixty percent of Americans said the
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United States should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, even if other
countries fail to act.232 Sixty-seven percent said that carbon dioxide should
be regulated as a pollutant, and 56% of Americans said they would rather
pay an extra $100 every year for their electricity if it would result in power
companies using more renewable energy sources.233
While Americans are finally starting to realize that climate change
is a serious problem, other countries are beginning to see carbon emissions
markets as the most viable solution. China has begun implementation
of its carbon market pilot programs. Iran announced in February 2014 that
it planned to implement a carbon market in order to reduce industrial
emissions in an economy that relies heavily on oil and natural gas.234 Eco-
nomic analysts predicted that the global carbon market would increase
by two-thirds between 2013 and 2014.235
The consensus amongst economists is that carbon markets are the
most cost-efficient solution to prevent climate change. They are more
cost-efficient and provide a greater degree of flexibility than command-
and-control policies, while incentivizing investment in cleaner technology.
Unlike carbon taxes, carbon markets provide a guaranteed emissions
reduction goal. Strict reduction targets are necessary if the United States
is to become a leader in mitigating climate change.
The most important “building block” of EPA’s Clean Power Plan
should be multistate carbon markets covering most, if not all, of the
United States. These carbon dioxide emissions trading schemes would
require progressively restrictive caps. This will ensure that as emissions
reduction goals are met, the market is not inundated with excess carbon
permits. The world needs the United States and China to reduce their
carbon emissions if the 2 °C temperature target is to be met. China’s
actions have shown that carbon markets are an integral part of any serious
effort to reduce emissions. The time has come for the United States to reach
the same conclusion.
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